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Abstract— Modern Air Traffic Management (ATM) concepts 
of operation require a strong interaction between agents such as 
human operators (pilots, air traffic controllers) and information 
technology systems (either on-ground or on-board). Although 
risks shall jointly be managed by all these agents, current risk 
assessment techniques are usually dedicated to only one class of 
agents (either human operators or IT systems). This paper 
addresses this issue. It proposes to extend Model Based Safety 
Assessment (MBSA) techniques originally developed to assess 
complex systems. This MBSA extension enables to assess how 
risk can be jointly managed by procedures and systems. The 
paper shows the methodology used and it presents lessons learnt 
from an aircraft trajectory management case study. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Modern Air Traffic Management (ATM) concepts of 
operation such as the one developed within the SESAR 
programme [4] require a strong interaction between agents 
such as human operators (pilots, air traffic controllers) and 
information technology systems (either on-ground or on-
board).  
Although risks shall jointly be managed by all these agents, 
current risk assessment techniques are usually dedicated to 
only one class of agents (either human operators or IT 
systems).  
This paper addresses this issue. It proposes to extend Model 
Based Safety Assessment (MBSA) techniques originally 
developed to assess complex systems. This MBSA extension 
enables to assess how risk can be jointly managed by 
procedures and systems.  
The paper shows the methodology used and it presents 
lessons learnt from an aircraft trajectory management case 
study. 
II. TRAJECTORY MANAGEMENT 
The management rules of aircraft trajectories are specified 
in ICAO’s Annex 2 – Rules of the Air [1].  We focus on the 
collision avoidance procedure applicable in the following case. 
Collision avoidance involves two aircrafts: one aircraft and 
another one that we will call the intruder aircraft. Both are in 
cruise phase and are converging approximately at the same 
flight level. The aircraft is flying in one sector, and it is flying 
in radar controlled airspace in instrumental flight conditions.  
According to ICAO specifications, the main actors of the 
Trajectory Management system of this scenario are :  
• Pilot:  In clear airspace the pilot can visually detect 
the appearance of an intruder; if this happens, the 
pilot shall ask the ATC for a route change. 
• Air Traffic Controller(ATC): If the airspace is not 
clear, or due to workload, the pilot cannot visually 
detect the intruder then the ATC in charge of that 
airspace sector shall inform the pilot and assist him 
during all the avoidance operation. The controller has 
access to some control panels where the radar 
tracking (ATCRBS – ATC Radar Beacon System) 
can be visualized, as well as VHF radios for oral 
communications and ADS (Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance) data-link communications.  
• Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) [6]: If 
both the pilot and the ATC fail in a prompt detection 
of the intruder, the TCAS equipment shall first 
announce the appearance of the intruder. It shall also 
provide the pilot with traffic advisories (TA) and 
resolution advisories (RA) depending of the distance 
between the two aircraft. When the RA is issued, the 
controller is no longer responsible for the separation 
of the aircraft until the conflict is terminated. 
Experience returns have proven the robustness of this 
procedure. However, incidents highlighted also its limits 
especially when equipment failures are combined with human 
inadequate performances. So we propose to conduct an 
integrated safety assessment of all the actors (human and 
equipments) to deal with such issues. 
 
III. PROPOSED SAFETY ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
 
The goal of safety assessment is to determine that every 
possible hazards (failure conditions) of a system were 
considered and that they were properly addressed.  The first 
step of the safety assessment is the identification of failure 
conditions of interest and  their classification according to 
their severity (ranging from Minor to Catastrophic). In this 
paper we focus on one catastrophic failure condition: aircraft 
collision due to total loss of conflict detection means.  
Quantitative and qualitative safety requirements are associated 
with the failure condition. For a Catastrophic failure condition, 
we consider the following qualitative requirement: “no 
combination of strictly less than 3 failures shall lead to the 
failure condition”.  
  
The system safety assessment examines the proposed 
architecture to determine how failures can cause the identified 
failure conditions. This assessment aims at showing that the 
qualitative and quantitative requirements are satisfied. 
Moreover, in case of aircraft systems, this assessment also 
establishes new safety requirements such as requested 
independence between component failures and requested 
minimal Development Assurance Level (DAL). We propose 
to apply the same principles to all the actors of the trajectory 
management systems.   
 
We have used two different tools to assess the safety of the 
trajectory management: 
• Cecilia-OCAS workbench from Dassault Aviation 
was used to model in AltaRica [9] trajectory 
management and to study sequences of events 
leading to the catastrophic failure condition. 
• DALculator tool [8] was used to generate  
independence, resource  allocation and DAL  
requirements.  
 
Usually these tools are used to model and analyse technical 
systems [7] and not human actors such as the aircraft crew or 
the air traffic controllers. The functioning modes of the 
technical systems of our simplified case study  are modelled 
by a boolean variable ok that is true when the system is 
working correctly and its results are reliable and false 
otherwise. We have extended the modelling approach to deal 
with human actor failures.  Since in trajectory management the 
main role of human actors is to detect the intruder aircraft we 
have introduced modes that degrade their capability to 
correctly detect the intruder 
• in mode ok, the actor correctly detects the intruder. 
• in mode positive, the actor always believes that there 
is an intruder, even if there is not.  
• in mode negative , the actor always believes there is 
not an intruder, even when there is.  
• in mode lost, the actor believes are undefined 
 
The model describes all the actors of the trajectory 
management scenario and their interaction. The model also 
includes an aircraft node that observes all the actions that 
could take place and lead to a collision. This node is used to 
generate automatically the sequences of failure events that 
lead to a collision.  
IV. RESULTS OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
To analyse the model, we first used the  Sequence Generation 
of the Cecilia tool. We found 34 sequences of events leading 
to the total loss on the conflict detection means. We used these 
sequences in the following ways. 
 
First, these sequences were used to check qualitative 
requirements. Two sequences of size equal to 2 contradict the 
qualitative requirements:  
{copilot_detection.fail_loss, pilot_detection.fail_loss}, 
{ ACFT.TCAS_fail, ATC_detection.fail_negative} 
However, the tolerance to two faults is a requirement justified 
by good practices of technical system design. Here, only the 
behaviour of the pilot, the co-pilot and controller play an 
important role that leads to a collision risk in these sequences. 
Indeed, only “single fault tolerance” is mandatory for the 
whole aircraft operation. Moreover, if fault tolerance issues 
can be solved by adding redundant equipments in the aircraft 
or in ground ATC station, we cannot easily have three pilots 
on board or two controllers working in the same stand. In 
conclusion, we made an exception and continued the analysis. 
 
Then the sequences were used to generate independence 
requirements. The rationale is the following. If we want to 
ensure that no single/double failure leads to a catastrophic 
failure, we shall also require that events which occur in 
sequences of size 2/3 are independent two by two. In our 
model, there are several sequences of order 3. According to 
this, their segregation was not studied by hand but with the 
help of the tool DALculator. 
 
DALculator proposed to require the independency of the items 
given in the table below. Independency implementation 
requires diversification of components. The table discusses 
also the diversification issues in our study case. 
Independent 
components 
Why can they be independent? 
pilot_detection 
copilot_detection 
Commonly is said that “there are 
not two people alike”. Pilot and 
co-pilot are independent because 
their decisions come from their 
inner professional criteria. 
ATC_detection 
TCAS 
The most obvious of the 
independences is between the 
different technologies human 
and systems are made of. 
processing_equipment_1 
processing_equipment_2 
The independence between these 
two items may be the most 
difficult to achieve, two 
processing equipment with 
different software are needed. 
processing_equipment_3 
TCAS 
As these two components have 
very different functions, they do 
not share common software 
computation. 
signal_comparator_1 Idem to the explanation above 
TCAS for the processing equipment and 
the TCAS. 
Table 1. Item Development Independence. 
Independency implementation also requires installing the 
items in different zones. DALculator tool also established the 
minimum physical zones where the components can be 
located. In our case at least two zones per group of 
components is needed: 
• Crew on board: pilot and co-pilot have different 
positions in the cockpit, with independent displays 
and flight controls; however it is impossible to place 
them in different zones of the aircraft, both of them 
need to be in the cockpit. Once again in this paper, 
we can highlight the differences between systems and 
humans. While a leakage of a pipe (“system_failure”) 
can lead to a catastrophic failure if it is over 
navigation wires; if the pilot cries 
(“pilot_belief=undefined”), the co-pilot will not be 
affected (“copilot_belief=ok”), maybe distracted and 
stressed, but capable to do his functions. 
• Controllers on ground: Their allocation behaviour is 
similar to the pilot and co-pilot situation. Various 
controllers share air traffic control centre but have 
separate stands, equipment and moods. 
• Systems on board: In this case study we only 
considered as on board equipment the TCAS and the 
VHF components. The results from the DALculator 
mean that the TCAS has to be allocated in a different 
place than the processing equipment and the signal 
comparators of the ATC radar. This is accomplished 
by the fact that all these components are on ground 
while the aircraft is cruising. According to the VHF 
system, results about the on board radio are not found 
with DALculator because they do not even appear in 
the Minimal Cut Sets done for order 6 with Cecilia 
tool, which means that these components are not 
critical and their malfunction does not lead to a real 
collision risk. 
• Systems on ground: we considered two big groups of 
systems: controller VHF radio and controller radar. 
Neither the controller’s radio nor some sub-systems 
of the radar (ATCBRS transponders and control 
panel displays) affect catastrophically in the scenario 
presented; but for the other radar’s sub-systems: one 
of the processing equipment shall be mounted apart 
from the others. The signal comparators can be in the 
same zone, as their function is just check the 
processing equipment results. 
 
 
Finally, after identifying feasible independence requirements, 
we used the generated sequences to perform the DAL 
allocation with the DALculator. 
The Development Assurance Level (DAL) classifies the level 
of development of the equipment in order to prevent or 
eliminate design errors with more or less care. Depending of 
the level of severity of the failure conditions, a different DAL 
will be required. As we are working with a model for 
catastrophic failure, the overall conflict detection function 
shall have a functional DAL (F-DAL) A. However, the DAL 
of the system items (I-DAL) can be lower. New DAL 
allocation rules introduced in ARP4754A allow downgrading 
some components that appear in the minimal cut sets. This 
downgrade is possible for independent components and 
considering that the local degradation of the DAL will not lead 
to a safety problem. The interest of downgrading some of the 
components is due to the inverse relation between severity 
level and development costs: as higher is the severity level, 
higher is the cost; so with the DAL study the purpose is to 
have a trade-off between these two agents. 
 
With DALculator the downgrade DAL can be obtained 
following two different approaches, both certified by 
international Authorities, so both valid. The final election 
between which one to choose will be made in order to 
optimize the development costs while preserving the 
feasibility. For instance, some too complex software cannot be 
currently certified at level A. 
 
Several allocations have been generated. A first DAL 
allocation was computed by selecting “Option 1” solver and 
constraining the TCAS to a DAL equal to C (its current usual 
DAL). This makes some other components to become class A. 
In particular for the co-pilot and the controller what this 
solution means is that, they have to be very reliable, so when 
they are needed, they are fully capable to avoid the intruder. 
The dependability on them also concerns their availability and 
continuity at work. In terms of safety, it is not interesting to 
workload the crew; however there is a positive point, there is 
not an increment of the development cost. . 
 
A second proposed “Option 1” allocation sets TCAS to DAL 
A. In this case, most of the components can be downgraded to 
DAL C. We also can observe that the crew on board and the 
controllers on ground are less needed, as they dependability 
decreases. Only the co-pilot has DAL A classification, he/she 
represents the last chance for visual detection. 
 
The tool shown also that “Option 2” is not feasible when 
TCAS DAL=C. “Option 2” when TCAS DAL=A is feasible. 
There is only one item with DAL A, the controller, as it is a 
human resource he/she is not an additional cost. 
 
Finally we did also the analysis for the combination of the two 
options and with the TCAS set to A. We got the following 
results: 
DAL Component 
A TCAS 
B pilot_detection 
 copilot_detection 
C ATC_detection 
 coATC_detection 
 processing_equipment_1  
 processing_equipment_2 
 processing_equipment_3 
 signal_comparator_1 
 signal_ comparator_2 
D The remaining components of the system. 
 
This last result seems optimal. However, it requires 
developing TCAS at DAL A.. 
V. LESSONS LEARNT 
One challenges of this work was to model the faulty behaviour 
of human actors and their interactions with the systems. We 
modelled the scenario for collision avoidance established by 
ICAO’s Rules of the Air in the AltaRica language. Another 
issue was to also to define requirements applicable to all 
actors of the system.  We proposed to apply the approach 
defined for complex aircraft systems in ARP 4754 and we 
discussed the interpretation of fault tolerance, independence 
and DAL requirements in the integrated analysis.  
The safety analysis allowed determining the principal 
differences between the components and the human actors 
involved in the collision avoidance procedure. These 
differences are: 
• Redundancy: In order to make more robust the 
procedure, we can have redundant equipment, but we 
cannot have a higher crew redundancy. We have to 
trust that the only two available pilots and the 
controller are able to do their work correctly. 
• Independence: The independence for components and 
human actors was studied with the same tool 
(DALculator), but the results have to be interpreted 
differently. Independence between two components 
means to have different development technologies 
between them to assure that the output data is 
reliable. While, independence between members of 
the crew is assured because it is intrinsic to human’s 
nature. 
• Zonal allocation: To determine the relative physical 
allocation of the items we also used DALculator tool. 
The allocation constraints are essential to place 
correctly the redundant and independent equipment; 
in order to avoid that a single failure is transmitted to 
other essential equipment for the avoidance. 
• DAL allocation. Currently highly qualified human 
actors are requested to recover lower DAL of TCAS. 
If TCAS can be qualified at a higher level, the 
balance could  be fruitfully re-equilibrated. 
   
Finally, it can be considered that this study – that models the 
nowadays collision avoidance procedure – propose a 
framework which can be applied for the analysis  of the next 
concept for collision avoiding, defined by the SESAR 
programme.  
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